considerable. In northern France too, the French had more tanks and better tanks. The victories were due to the professionalism of the German Army, from the General Staff to the common soldier, and the fact that they knew what they were about.
It all has to do with Clausewitz's assertion that war is in the heart and mind; weapons are merely the means of waging war. New weapons will probably modify tactics, and may even modify strategy; but the essence of war or conflict is in the heart and mind. Now from what I have read, it has been part of the tradition of the German Army for 150 years that there should be almost a marriage of minds between the army commander and his chief of staff. Each should be so attuned to the thinking of the other, that in moments of crisis when one is absent, each will know what the other would do, be able to give the appropriate orders, and be obeyed. The spectacular invasion of Rumania in 1916, executed by Field Marshal von Mackenson and General von Seekt, his chief of staff, was cited as a good example.
Whether this is strictly true, all my experience, both in the law and outside it, confirms that the degree of success in any enterprise is likely to be governed by the degree of mutual understanding between those in charge of it at the start. Take a criminal prosecution, for example, if there is any serious misunderstanding between those who are supposed to be in charge, by the time it is well and truly under way it is likely to have all the appearance of being a shambles.
However to return to the German Army. When von Seekt resurrected the General Staff of the Reichswehr (as it was then called), under the nose of the British occupation, between 1919 and 1926, he based it upon the great Prussian traditions of loyalty to the head of state, and devotion to duty whatever the cost. Nothing wrong in that; we were taught exactly the same at Winchester College.